We consider retail space-exchange problems where two retailers exchange shelf space to increase accessibility to more of their consumers in more locations without opening new stores. Using the Hotelling model, we …nd two retailers'optimal prices given their host and guest space in two stores under the space-exchange strategy. Next, using the optimal space-dependent prices, we analyze a non-cooperative game where each retailer makes a space allocation decision for the retailer's own store. We show that the two retailers will implement such a strategy in the game, if and only if their stores are large enough to serve more than one-half of their consumers.
Introduction
Can retailers selling di¤erent products implement partnership strategies that involve exchanging shelf space to improve their operating performance? Consider the following problem (and its solution) that was experienced by the British supermarket chain of food-related products known as Waitrose [15] : Even though its sales were increasing, many of Waitrose's potential customers were having di¢ culty accessing its stores because no new stores were being opened.
In order to increase accessibility to more of its customers in more locations without opening new stores, Waitrose established new channels and implemented a new business model. This was achieved by initiating strategic relationships with the British retailer of healthcare products known as Boots. Waitrose and Boots now stock "selective product ranges" in each others' stores; more speci…cally, Waitrose's food products are sold in Boots's stores, while the latter retailer's healthcare products are displayed for sale in Waitrose stores. The cooperation between Waitrose and Boots can be regarded as an implementation of the retail space-exchange strategy; see Stych [14] for a magazine article describing this partnership.
Waitrose and Boots have successfully implemented the space-exchange strategy, as indicated in a report by The Waitrose Press Center [15] . As another successful example of this novel strategy, Canada's favourite doughnut store known as Tim Hortons has been working with the U.S.-based Cold Stone Creamery (a chain stores of ice cream) to implement the space-exchange strategy and operate their "co-branded"stores. This practice involves 100 stores in the U.S. and six in Canada. For more information, see Draper [5] for an article describing the partnership between Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery.
With the novel retailing practice described above, when two retailers (say, 1 and 2) implement their space-exchange strategy, a retailer's consumers can buy in either the retailer's own store or the other retailer's store, which means that such a strategy can result in an increased store choice for consumers. It is reasonable to expect that each consumer would buy in a store that is closer to his or her residence location, thereby incurring lower travel costs and increasing the willingness to buy at a higher retail price. Speci…cally, when two retailers do not exchange their space, consumers who intend to buy a retailer's product will have to visit the retailer's own store; but, after the space exchange, some consumers may decide to shop at the other retailer's store (because it is closer to those consumers). This implies that the space-exchange strategy will reduce the travelling costs of some consumers who buy a retailer's product at the other retailer's store. Since each consumer does not need to incur a high travelling cost, he or she should be willing to buy even if the retail price is increased. Thus, both retailers 1 and 2 may respond by raising their prices to increase their pro…t margins. This can be regarded as the most important bene…t derived from the space-exchange strategy. We …nd that each retailer's pricing and space allocation decisions are important to the success of the space-exchange strategy, which are the focused research questions in our paper.
One may question why the two retailers do not sell both products 1 and 2 by themselves in their own stores but instead exchange shelf space for the sale of these products. We present three reasons for this: First, when the two retailers sell identical products at their sites, they have to compete for consumers, which may result in the reduction of the two retailers'pro…ts. Second, the two retailers have more information about their own products and are thus specialized in their product sales. If each retailer sells his own product and also the other retailer's product, then the retailer has to allocate his e¤orts for the sale of the product that is unfamiliar to the retailer; this may reduce the retailer's operational pro…tability. Third, since the retailers should have already served their markets before the space exchange, their established reputations may a¤ect consumers' purchasing decisions. Hence, to reduce the operational risk, each retailer should optimally allocate his space to the other retailer and thus take advantage of the other retailer's reputation to e¢ ciently provide more choices to consumers.
As the above discussion indicates, the space-exchange strategy should generate bene…ts to both retailers and their consumers; and, in practice, some retailers (e.g., Waitrose and Boots, Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery) have already successfully implemented this strategy.
Despite the apparent importance of this strategy, our literature search did not reveal any research papers dealing with space-exchange problems. There are a number of space-related publications, which do not consider the space exchange-related issues. In one publication that is closely related to our paper, Jerath and Zhang [9] consider a store-within-a-store arrangement in which a retailer rents out her retail space to two manufacturers who then have complete autonomy over retail decisions such as pricing and in-store service. The authors develop an analytical model to investigate the retailer's trade-o¤ between channel e¢ ciency and interbrand competition. They show that the retailer cannot credibly commit to the retail prices and service levels that two manufacturers can achieve in an integrated channel, and she should thus allow the manufacturers to set up stores within her store. In another related publication, [4] , Martínez-de- Albéniz and Roels analyze a shelf-space competition problem where a single retailer optimizes her shelf space allocation among multiple suppliers'di¤erent products based on their sales level and pro…t margins. The authors examine the equilibrium situation in the supply chain, and found that, in general, the retailer's and the suppliers'incentives are misaligned, resulting in suboptimal retail prices and shelf space allocations. Other recent representative space-related publications include Baron, Berman, and Perry [1] , Campo, et al. [2] , Kurtuluş and Toktay [10] , and Wang and Gerchak [17] .
In this paper, we use the Hotelling model [8] in Section 2 to analyze the space-exchange problem where retailers 1 and 2 are located at two end points of a linear city. For detailed discussions on the Hotelling model and its extensions, see, e.g., Martin [11] and Tirole [16] . The Hotelling model has been widely used to analyze marketing-and operations management-related problems. The recent representative publications, where the Hotelling models are considered, include, e.g., Dasci and Laporte [3] , Ghosh and Balachander [6] , Granot, Granot, and Raviv [7] , and Sajeesh and Raju [12] .
In our space-exchange problem, retailer i (i = 1; 2) sells product i to his consumers who are uniformly distributed between the two retailers. Since the success of the space-exchange strategy naturally depends on whether or not each retailer bene…ts from this strategy, we begin our analysis by …nding each retailer's optimal pricing decision and maximum pro…t when they do not exchange shelf space, which are later compared with two retailers' pro…ts under the space-exchange strategy. Next, when the two retailers decide to exchange shelf space, we …rst temporarily assume that, in each store, two retailers have su¢ ciently large space to serve all of their consumers, and calculate their corresponding optimal prices with no space (capacity) constraint.
We then …nd in Section 3 each retailer's optimal prices under the space constraint, i.e., the retailer's host space in his own store and his guest space allocated by the other retailer are arbitrarily given. Using two retailers'optimal space-dependent prices, we next analyze in Section 4 a non-cooperative game where each retailer maximizes his total pro…t in two stores to determine optimal space allocation decision for his own store and …nd the corresponding optimal prices for his product in two stores. We perform our best-response analysis for two retailers, and …nd that Nash equilibrium for the game may or may not uniquely exist, which depends on consumers'consumption utilities, trip cost, and the total space in each store. We show that, adopting the Nash equilibrium, each retailer can achieve a higher pro…t than before the space exchange. In Section 5, we discuss possible changes of our major results in the presence of a "common" consumer who buys both products 1 and 2, or those when a retailer's …xed cost of opening and sta¢ ng a new store is considered.
Preliminaries
As indicated by the practice of Waitrose and Boots and also by that of Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery, the retail space-exchange strategy applies only when the cooperating retailers'products are neither substitutable nor complementary, e.g., Waitrose's food vs. Boots's healthcare products; and, Tim Hortons's doughnuts vs. Cold Stone Creamery's ice cream.
Thus, we can reasonably assume that the products in categories i = 1; 2 sold by retailer i = 1; 2, are neither substitutable nor complementary.
The total shelf space that is owned by retailer i is denoted by S i > 0 for i = 1; 2. To implement the space-exchange strategy, retailer i-who sells product i-decides to allocate the retail space S ij 2 [0; S i ] to retailer j (j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i) who can then sell product j using the space S ij at the site of retailer i as the "guest retailer."As a result of the space exchange, retailer i sells product i in the remaining space S ii S i S ij at his own store as the "host retailer." As discussed in Section 1, when two retailers exchange shelf space, their customers may incur lower travel costs, and the two retailers may thus increase their retail prices without losing customers. This may be regarded as an important reason why retailers (e.g., Waitrose
and Boots, Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery) exchange shelf space. Accordingly, we consider the Hotelling model [8] to analyze our space-exchange problem, assuming that two retailers are located at the end points of a "linear city" of length 1, and all consumers are uniformly distributed along the city.
Since the two retailers are willing to exchange shelf space when they can enjoy more pro…ts from the strategy, we need to compare the two retailers'pro…ts before and after the exchange of shelf space. We next begin by computing two retailers' optimal prices and corresponding maximum pro…ts when they do not exchange shelf space but only operate in their own stores.
Optimal Pricing Decision with No Space Exchange
When retailers 1 and 2 do not exchange shelf space, they sell products 1 and 2 at the retail prices p 1 and p 2 , respectively. Total number of consumers for product i is B i , for i = 1; 2. In this paper, we assume that there is no "common"consumer who intends to buy both products 1 and 2; that is, B 1 and B 2 are disjoint. In Section 5.1, we will discuss the impacts of relaxing such an assumption on our major results. As in the Hotelling model [8] , each consumer incurs the transportation cost t per unit of trip length, which includes the consumer's value of time.
Let x 2 [0; 1] denote a point in the linear city. Assuming that the locations of retailers 1 and 2 are x = 0 and x = 1, respectively, we can calculate the trip cost of the product 1 consumer (who is served by retailer 1) at the point x 2 [0; 1] as tx, and also compute that of the product 2 consumer (who is served by retailer 2) at the point x 2 [0; 1] as t(1 x); see Figure 1 . In addition, each product i (i = 1; 2) consumer is assumed to draw a gross utility u i from buying a unit of product i. Using the above, we …nd that the product 1 consumer at the point x 2 [0; 1] obtains the utility u 1 but incurs the purchase cost p 1 and the trip cost tx, and the product 2 consumer at the point x 2 [0; 1] gets the utility u 2 but incurs the purchase cost p 2 and the trip cost t(1 x).
It thus follows that the net utility function of the consumer at location x is calculated as,
A product 1 consumer should be willing to buy from retailer 1 if u x1 0, or, x x 1 ( u 1 p 1 )=t.
This means that only the product 1 consumers who are located between 0 (retailer 1's location) and x 1 should decide to buy. Naturally, retailer 1 should set his retail price p 1 such that 0 x 1 1, or u 1 t p 1 u 1 . Similarly, retailer 2 should determine her price p 2 such that
Then, we can calculate the demand faced by retailer
However, each retailer may or may not satisfy his demand, because he only has the space S i to stock product i. Assuming that each retailer can display one unit of his product on a unit of the retail space, we …nd that retailer i can realize the sales min[B i ( u i p i )=t; S i ], and achieve the pro…t as,
where c i denotes retailer i's unit acquisition cost. To determine the optimal price p i for retailer i, we must solve the constrained maximization problem, max u i t p i u i i .
Lemma 1 When two retailers do not exchange shelf space, the optimal prices and maximum pro…ts for retailer i (i = 1; 2) can be found as follows:
Proof. For a proof of this lemma and the proofs of all subsequent lemmas, see online Appendix A.
Optimal Retail Prices under the Space-Exchange Strategy with Su¢ ciently-Large Host and Guest Spaces
We consider the two retailers' optimal pricing decisions when they decide to exchange shelf space. Now, we temporarily assume that each retailer's host space and guest space are large enough to serve all of the retailer's consumers; and, under this assumption, we compute the retailer's optimal prices. After the space exchange, each consumer can buy in either retailer 1's store or retailer 2's store, which depends on from which store the consumer can draw a higher net utility. Consider the product i (i = 1; 2) consumer who resides at the point x 2 [0; 1] and decides to buy a unit of product i from retailer i at either his host space [in retailer i's store] or his guest space [in retailer j's (j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i) store]. We compute the consumer's utilities drawn from purchasing from two stores as,
whereû xij denotes the product i consumer's net utility drawn from buying at retailer j's store, and p ij represents the retail price of product i in retailer j's store.
Similar to Section 2.1, we can compute the demands faced by retailer i in two stores, as given in the following remark. For a detailed discussion, see online Appendix C.
Remark 1
We …nd the demands for retailer i's product (i = 1; 2) as follows: 
From the above we …nd that all product i consumers will buy when p i1 +p i2 2 u i t whereas some consumer(s) may not buy when As the above lemma indicates, retailer i may need to determine his prices in two stores to serve some, rather than all, of B i product i consumers, if the product i consumer residing at
Condition Optimal Prices

Demands
Maximum Pro…t the location of retailer j's store (j = 1; 2, j 6 = i) cannot enjoy a positive net utility from buying product i in retailer i's store, i.e., u i c i + t.
Optimal Prices Given the Space Allocation Decisions
In this section, we consider two retailers'optimal pricing decisions given the space-allocation decisions in two stores. (The results here di¤er from those in Section 2.2 where we determine the two retailers' optimal prices assuming that they have su¢ cient host and guest space.) Subsequently, using each retailer's optimal space-dependent prices in two stores, we …nd the optimal allocation of the total space S i (i = 1; 2) between the two retailers.
Next, we determine retailer i's (i = 1; 2) optimal pricing decisions (p i1 and p i2 ) given the host space S ii in his own store and the guest space S ji = S j S jj in retailer j's (j = 1; 2, j 6 = i) store. Since one unit of product i is carried per unit of shelf space, the total number of product i available for sale in two stores can be calculated as T i S 1i + S 2i . Note that each retailer's maximum available products in each store can be regarded as the "capacity" for the retailer, who should thus make his or her optimal pricing decisions under the capacity constraint.
As Lemma 2 indicates, retailer i's optimal pricing decisions with no capacity constraint depend on the comparison between u i and c i + t. Accordingly, we consider the two cases, (i) u i > c i + t, and (ii) u i c i + t; and for each case, we …nd retailer i's optimal prices under the capacity constraints (i.e., at most S ii and S ji units of product i are available for sale in retailer i's own store and in retailer j's store).
Optimal Prices when
If u i > c i + t, then we learn from Lemma 2 that retailer i should make his pricing decisions to serve all B i product i consumers, which requires this retailer to have a su¢ ciently-large space to stock B i units of product i. Additionally, since retailer i's pro…t is maximized when S ii = S ji = B i =2, his desired host space and guest space should be both equal to B i =2. However, the space allocated to retailer i in each store may be di¤erent from B i =2, and the total space for retailer i in two stores may or may not be large enough to serve all of B i consumers. More speci…cally, if the total space for retailer i is given such that S ii + S ji B i , then the total demand B i can be satis…ed; but, if S ii + S ji < B i , then only a part of the demand will be ful…lled.
Lemma 3
Suppose that retailer i's (i = 1; 2) host space and guest space are given as S ii 2 [0;
and S ji 2 [0; S j ], for j = 1; 2, and j 6 = i. If u i > c i + t, then retailer i's optimal prices in two stores are found as follows:
1. If retailer i's total space S ii + S ji in two stores is large enough to serve all of B i product i consumers, i.e., S ii + S ji B i , then the retailer's optimal prices in his own store and retailer j's store-denoted by p ii and p ij , respectively-are determined as given in Table   2 . 2. If S ii + S ji < B i , then the retailer's optimal pricing decisions are obtained as,
Next, we compare retailer i's optimal price with no space exchange-as given in Lemma 1-and the optimal price under the space-exchange strategy-as given in Lemma 3, in order to examine the impact of the strategy on the retailer's pricing decision.
Lemma 4 When u i > c i + t (i = 1; 2) and retailer i's host space and guest space are given as This lemma says that, if retailer i has a su¢ ciently large space in his own store, i.e., S i B i ( u i c i )=(2t), then his prices in two stores under the space-exchange strategy should be higher than the price when two retailers do not exchange shelf space. Moreover, we note that
This means that the prices should rise as a result of the space-exchange strategy, if the total available space S i in retailer i's store is large enough to satisfy more than a half of product i consumers (including some consumers who are closer to retailer j's store). This interesting result may be justi…ed as follows: After the space exchange, those consumers closer to retailer j's store could visit retailer j's store to buy product i. That is, retailer i may serve fewer consumers in his own store, and may thus raise his retail price to increase his pro…t.
Remark 2 Lemma 3 was used for comparing retailer i's (i = 1; 2) prices under di¤erent conditions. We can use the same lemma to calculate the retailer's maximum pro…t as given in Table   3 . C Table 3 : Retailer i's maximum pro…t when u i > c i + t.
In Section 2.1 we found retailer i's optimal pricing decision and computed the corresponding maximum pro…t when the two retailers do not exchange shelf space. We now compare retailer i's maximum pro…t (i) with no space exchange and (ii) with space exchange strategy, in order to examine whether or not two retailers can bene…t from the strategy.
Corollary 1 If the two retailers implement the space-exchange strategy when u i > c i + t, then we …nd that i i (i = 1; : : : ; 8, i 6 = 6) in Table 3 is greater than retailer i's pro…t when two retailers do not exchange shelf space. However, Table 3 may be smaller than the retailer's pro…t with no space exchange. J As the above corollary indicates, retailer i (i = 1; 2) may be worse o¤ under the spaceexchange strategy, if he cannot use his host space and guest space to serve all of B i product i consumers (i.e., S ii + S ji < B i ), and both the host space and the guest space are smaller than
. This means that, in order to cooperate for such a strategy, retailer i should retain a su¢ ciently large host space and retailer j (j = 1; 2, j 6 = i) must also allocate a su¢ ciently large guest space to retailer i. However, even though Table 3 may be smaller than the pro…t with no space exchange, retailer i should still be better o¤ from implementing the space-exchange strategy because he can choose to allocate S ii units to himself. For example, the retailer can increase S 11 to a level such that his pro…t is 7 i , which is higher than the retailer's pro…t when there is no space exchange.
Optimal Prices when u i c i + t
When u i c i +t (i = 1; 2), we found in Lemma 2 that, if there is no capacity constraint, retailer i's pro…t is maximized when p ii = p ij = ( u i + c i )=2 (j = 1; 2, j 6 = i) and the corresponding demands in two stores are
. We now investigate the retailer's optimal pricing decisions given his host space and guest space. 
, then retailer i's optimal prices p ii and p ij under the space-exchange strategy are both higher than his optimal price p i when two retailers do not exchange shelf space. However, if S i < B i ( u i c i )=(2t), then p ii is always greater than p i ; but, p ij may or may not be greater than p i . We …nd that p ij > p i when S ji S i .
Lemma 5 gives us retailer i's pricing decisions in two stores, when the product i consumer residing at the location of a retailer's store cannot enjoy a positive net utility if he or she decides to buy in the other retailer's store (i.e., u i c i + t). As Lemma 5 implies, the retailer should increase his price in his own store, when he cooperates with the other retailer for the space-exchange strategy. However, after retailer i also operates in retailer j's store using the guest space S ji , his price for product i in retailer j's store may be lower than that in retailer i's own store before the space exchange. More speci…cally, if the total space S i in retailer i's store is su¢ ciently large [i.e., S i B i ( u i t)=(2t)], then, no matter what the guest space S ji -that is allocated by retailer j to retailer i-is, retailer i should always set the price p ij higher than p i . Otherwise, if retailer i cannot use the total space S i in his own store to serve a half of B i product i consumers, i.e., S i < B i ( u i c i )=(2t), then the retailer may or may not set a price higher than p i , which depends on the value of the guest space S ji . If the guest space is larger than the total space S i in retailer i's own store, then retailer i may choose a price lower than p i in order to entice more consumers to buy product i in retailer j's store, because the space in the retailer's own store is very small. Otherwise, if the guest space S ji is also very small (i.e., S ji < S 1 ), then retailer i is unable to serve all (or even, most of) product i consumers, and should thus increase the prices in two stores to improve his pro…t.
Lemmas 4 and 5 indicates the comparison between retailer i's optimal prices with and without the space exchange, for the case that u i > c i + t and the case that u i c i + t, respectively. Using these results, we reach a conclusion regarding the impacts of the spaceexchange strategy on the retail prices, as given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When retailers 1 and 2 implement the space-exchange strategy, each retailer's prices for his products in two stores are higher than the retailer's price in his own store when two retailers do not exchange shelf space.
Proof. A proof for this proposition and our proofs for all subsequent propositions are provided in online Appendix B.
The above proposition indicates that, if two retailers decide to exchange shelf space, then they should raise their retail prices. Using Lemmas 3 and 5, we can also …nd the following result regarding each retailer's two prices in two stores.
Proposition 2
Retailer i (i = 1; 2) may determine di¤erent prices for product i in two stores.
That is, after two retailers exchange shelf space, the retail prices of the same products at two stores may not be identical.
We also note from Lemmas 3 and 5 that retailer i's optimal pricing decisions when u i c i +t are the same as those when u i > c i +t and S ii +S ji < B i . Thus, the retailer's possible maximum pro…ts when u i c i +t should include those when S ii +S ji < B i in Table 3 . Similar to Corollary 1, we …nd that, when u i c i + t, Table 3 -is greater than retailer i's pro…t when two retailers do not exchange shelf space; but, Table 3 may be smaller than the retailer's pro…t with no space exchange, which depends on the values of S ii and S ji .
In addition to k i (k = 6; 7; 8) in Table 3 , retailer i may achieve the maximum pro…t
i is not considered for the case that S ii + S ji < B i in Table 3 , because the conditions that
, which is contrary to the
Similar to our previous discussion for the case that u i > c i + t, we …nd that, if retailer i's host space and guest space are both small, then the retailer may not achieve a higher pro…t from implementing the space-exchange strategy and may thus lose the incentive to cooperate with retailer j. On the other hand, if the retailer has a su¢ ciently large space in his own store and/or retailer j's store, then he should obtain a pro…t that is higher than the pro…t with no space exchange. That is, in order to entice retailer i to exchange his space with retailer j, retailer j may need to allocate a su¢ ciently large space to retailer i.
Nash Equilibrium Space-Allocation Decisions
We now investigate the optimal allocation of each store's shelf space between two retailers in the equilibrium. That is, we determine the optimal values of S ii and S ij in retailer i's store where S ii + S ij = S i , for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. Since the total space in each store (i.e., S i ) is given, retailer i only needs to determine the value of S ii and allocates the remaining space
To …nd the optimal space decision, each retailer should maximize the sum of his pro…ts generated in two stores. Thus, the space allocation problem can be naturally regarded as a "simultaneous-move"non-cooperative game, and the two retailers'optimal space allocation decisions should be characterized by Nash equilibrium.
To solve the non-cooperative game and …nd the Nash equilibrium, we need to …rst analyze each retailer's best response-i.e., the optimal space decision for a given space allocation decision of the other retailer. Next, we begin by …nding retailer i's best space allocation decision for his own store, assuming that retailer j decides to retain the space S jj and allocate the space S ji to retailer i.
The Best-Response Analysis
To implement the space-exchange strategy, retailer i (i = 1; 2) uses the guest space S ji -given by retailer j (j = 1; 2, j 6 = i)-to serve some or all product i consumers, and determines his host space S ii 2 [0; S i ] and allocate the space S ij = S i S ii to retailer j. Thus, to …nd the best response to retailer j's space allocation decision, retailer i should …nd the optimal host space that maximizes his own pro…t. As discussed in Section 3, we calculate retailer i's maximum pro…t given the retailer's host space and guest space, as shown in Table 3 .
Next, we assume that the guest space S ji 2 [0; S j ] is given, and use our results in Table 3 to …nd the optimal host space S ii (best response) for retailer i. Because our analysis in Section 3
indicates that retailer i's optimal pricing decisions depends on the comparison between u i and c i + t, we consider the retailer's optimal space allocation decision for the two cases: u i > c i + t and u i c i + t.
The Best Response when u i > c i + t
We now determine retailer i's best space allocation decision, when the product i consumer residing at the site of retailer j's store can gain a positive net utility if he or she visits retailer i's store to buy product i (i.e., u i > c i + t).
Lemma 6 When u i > c i +t, retailer i's optimal space allocation decision depends on the values of S ji and the total space S i in his own store, as shown in Table 4 .
From the above lemma, we learn that, if either the total space S i in retailer i's own store or the retailer's guest space S ji (allocated by retailer j) cannot be used to serve a half of B 1 product 1 consumers, then retailer i should make his space allocation decision to serve a part (rather than all) of B i consumers. Otherwise, if both S i and S ji are large enough to serve a
Conditions
Optimal Space Decision
S ii = S i and S ij = 0.
(Some consumers may not buy.)
(All consumers buy.)
(Some consumers may not buy.) Table 4 : Retailer i's best-response space decision when u i > c i + t.
half of product i consumers, then the retailer should determine his host space such that all consumers will buy in two stores. This may re ‡ect the fact that retailer i intends to serve all product i consumers using his space in two stores. Thus, if retailer j allocates a su¢ ciently large space to retailer i and the total space S i in retailer i's store is also su¢ ciently large, then retailer i should decide to retain a host space that is large enough to assure that he can serve all consumers in two stores.
However, if retailer i cannot serve B i =2 consumers in his guest space S ji , then he should not retain a large host space to serve all consumers, which may be justi…ed as follows: When the guest space is so small that less than a half of consumers are willing to buy, retailer i should have to use his host space to serve more than a half of B i consumers if he intends to serve all consumers in two stores. But, in order to sell more than B i =2 units of product i in retailer i's own store, the retailer has to reduce his retail price to a low level, which may thus reduce his total pro…t. Similarly, if S i is small, then retailer i should accept a small guest space from retailer j and should not serve all consumers.
The Best Response when u i c i + t
From Lemmas 3 and 5 we …nd that, if u i c i + t, then retailer i's optimal prices in two stores are the same as those when u i > c i + t and S ii + S ji < B i . Thus, the retailer's maximum pro…t when u i c i + t is the same as that when S ii + S ji < B i in Table 3 .
, then retailer i's best-response space allocation decision is the same as that when S i + S ji < B i in last row of Table 4 .
As the above lemma indicates, retailer i (i = 1; 2) should make his space allocation decision to serve a part of B i product i consumers if the product i consumer at the site of retailer j's (j = 1; 2, j 6 = i) store cannot enjoy a positive net utility when he or she buys in retailer i's store, i.e., u i c i + t. For this case, if two retailers do not implement the space-exchange strategy, then some consumers who are closer to the site of retailer j do not buy product i. After the space exchange, retailer i may need to utilize his guest space to serve those consumers (who do not buy before the space exchange). Note that, in the linear city, a half of total product i consumers (i.e., B i consumers) are closer to retailer j's store, and they could prefer to buy in retailer j's rather than retailer i's store. This means that, as a consequence of the space exchange, retailer i may serve less consumers in his store and may thus raise the retail price in his own store to increase his pro…t margin. In addition, to assure the retailer's pro…t in retailer j's store, the retailer should not reduce his price for product i in retailer j's store to a low level, which may discourage some consumers from buying product i. Therefore, to maximize retailer i's total pro…t in two stores, the retailer may make his pricing and space allocation decisions to only serve a part of B i consumers.
Nash Equilibrium
We use our above best-response analysis for two retailers to …nd the Nash equilibrium (S ; and, after each retailer makes his or her optimal space decision, the retailer's optimal price is correspondingly determined using our results in Section 3.
We …nd from our best-response analysis that in some cases, a retailer may allocate zero space to the other retailer. For example, if u i c i > t, S i + S ji B i , S ji B i =2, and 
In the above proposition, we note that, for retailer
or ( u i c i )=(2t) must be greater than or equal to 1/2. That is, for the "simultaneous-mover" game, the total shelf space S i in retailer i's own store must be large enough to serve more than a half of B i product i consumers, in order to let retailer i have an incentive for the space exchange with retailer j (j = 1; 2, j 6 = i). Thus, two retailers should have su¢ cient shelf space in their own stores in order to implement the space-exchange strategy. Otherwise, they may have no incentive for the space exchange in the game.
One may note that two retailers with small shelf space could also consider the space-exchange strategy. For example, suppose that retailer i (i = 1; 2) can stock only two units of product i in his store before the space exchange, i.e., S i = 2, for i = 1; 2. When two retailers do not exchange shelf space, retailer i would set his price such that the two consumers who are the closest to the retailer along the Hotelling line would …nd it worthwhile to buy product i. If two retailers exchange shelf space, then they may raise their prices without losing any consumers, and their pro…ts could thus be higher than those in the "no space exchange" case.
This di¤ers from Proposition 3, which is justi…ed as follows: Proposition 3 holds when two retailers make their decisions in the non-cooperative game whereas the above discussion is based on the assumption that two retailers jointly make their decisions in the cooperative setting. For a detailed discussion, see online Appendix E. Note that we use the Hotelling model to analyze the space-exchange problem; thus, Proposition 3 applies to the non-cooperative setting.
Since two retailers decide to exchange shelf space in the "simultaneous-move" game if and only if the non-zero space allocation decisions exist in Nash equilibrium, we next analyze our non-cooperative space-exchange game to …nd Nash equilibrium under the condition in Proposition 3. We learn from our previous analysis that two retailers make their pricing and space decisions according to whether or not all consumers for each product can enjoy a positive net utility from buying at each end point (i.e., the site of each retailer's store) of the linear city.
Accordingly, we should compare u i and c i + t for retailer i, in order to compute the Nash equilibrium for the space-exchange problem. Hence, for our game analysis, we need to consider the following three cases: (i) u i c i + t, for i = 1; 2; (ii) u i > c i + t and u j c j + t, for i; j = 1; 2, i 6 = j; and (iii) u i > c i + t, for i = 1; 2.
Our best-response analysis indicates that, when u i > c i + t, retailer i has a number of di¤erent optimal space decisions dependent on the space in his own store and his guest space.
Therefore, for Case (iii), there should be a number of possible Nash equilibria, which depend on the total space in each retailer's store. In order to facilitate our discussion, we …rst consider Case (i), and …nd the corresponding Nash equilibrium. This is then followed by our discussion by the remaining two cases.
Nash Equilibrium when
Using our best-response analysis in Section 4.1, we now solve the two-person non-cooperative game to …nd the Nash equilibrium for retailers 1 and 2. should fully use his guest space S N ji (j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i) to serve some product i consumers who are closer to retailer j's store, respectively. However, according to our best-response analysis, we note that two retailers do not serve all of their consumers, when they choose the Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, the two retailers' prices in both host space and guest space are higher than their prices determined when there is no space exchange, as shown in Lemma 5. 
That is, if S j equals the space that is needed to stock B i ( u i c i )=(2t) units of product i and B j ( u j c j )=(2t) units of product j, then retailer i should set an identical price ( u i + c i )=2 for product i in two stores. Otherwise, retailer i should determine di¤erent prices.
Moreover, two retailers can achieve higher pro…ts compared with those before they exchange shelf space, which means that they should have incentives to cooperate with the space-exchange strategy.
Nash
Equilibrium when u i > c i + t and u j c j + t (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j)
We now consider the case where all product i (i = 1; 2) consumers can achieve a positive net utility from buying in two stores (i.e., u i > c i + t) but some product j (j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i) consumers (e.g., the consumer residing at the site of a retailer's store) cannot draw a positive net utility from their purchases in a store (i.e., u j c j + t).
Lemma 9 When u i > c i + t and u j c j + t, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which depends on the value of S j , as given in Table 5 . Table 5 : Nash equilibrium when u i > c i + t and u j c j + t, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. Similar to our analysis for Case (i) u i c i + t (i = 1; 2), we can use Lemma 3 and 5 to compute two retailers'corresponding optimal prices for each of three possible Nash equilibria in Table 5 . We …nd that each retailer's prices in two stores are both higher than the retailer's price before the space exchange. This means that implementing the space-exchange strategy raises the retail prices. From Lemma 9 we …nd that, if not all product j (j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i) consumers can enjoy a positive net utility, then the total space S j in retailer j's store impacts two retailers' Nash equilibrium decisions. Moreover, whatever the value of S j is, retailer j's Nash equilibrium space is always determined as B j ( u j c j )=(2t). Using Table 5 , we obtain If retailer i still hopes to ful…ll all consumers'demands, then the retailer should keep a large host space to serve most of his consumers. To assure that most consumers (especially those closer to retailer j's store) are willing to buy in retailer i's store, retailer i should set a su¢ ciently low retail price for product i in his host space, which, but, results in a low pro…t. Therefore, if S j is signi…cantly small, then retailer i should determine his host space as S N ii = B i ( u i c i )=(2t) in order to guarantee his pro…t; and as a result, some product i consumers will not decide to buy.
Nash Equilibrium when u i > c i + t (i = 1; 2)
We now solve our non-cooperative game for Case (iii) where both product 1 consumers and product 2 consumers can gain a positive net utility from buying in any store, i.e., u i > c i + t, for i = 1; 2. The analysis for this case is much more complicated than the above two cases, and there are many possible Nash equilibria. Thus, we only show the existence of Nash equilibrium in the following theorem but the speci…c Nash equilibria are provided in online Appendix F.
Lemma 10 When u i > c i + t (i = 1; 2), then the corresponding Nash equilibrium (S N ii ; S N jj ) (j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i) must exist but it may or may not be unique. More speci…cally, if the total shelf space of two stores is not the same as that needed to exactly serve two retailers'consumers, then Nash equilibrium for the game uniquely exists. Otherwise, the Nash equilibrium may not be unique, which depends on consumers'utilities and trip costs as well as the total available shelf space in each retailer's store. All possible Nash equilibria are given in Table 7 (see online
Appendix F).
Similar to our analysis for the above cases, we can use Lemma 3 to compute two retailers' corresponding optimal prices for each possible Nash equilibrium given in Table 7 . Moreover, we …nd from Lemma 3 that each retailer's optimal prices in both the host space and the guest space are higher than the retailer's price when two retailers do not implement the space-exchange strategy. That is, such a strategy induces two retailers to increase their prices.
Further Discussions
In the preceding sections, we analyzed the space-exchange problem and found the Nash equilibrium pricing and space-allocation decisions. We now provide a further discussion on possible changes of our major results in the following two settings: We …rst consider a more realistic case where there exists at least one "common"consumer who buys both products 1 and 2, and then investigate whether or not our results will change in the setting where a retailer's …xed cost of opening and sta¢ ng a new store is considered.
Presence of Common Consumers
In our model, the set of product 1 consumers and the set of product 2 consumers are assumed to be disjoint. This means that, at any point along the Hotelling line, the product 1 consumer is di¤erent from the product 2 consumer. Such an assumption may be applicable to the space-exchange problem to some extent for the following reason: As indicated by the practice of Waitrose and Boots and also by that of Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery, the space-exchange strategy applies only when the cooperating retailers'products are neither substitutable nor complementary, e.g., Waitrose's food vs. Boots's healthcare products; and, Tim Hortons's doughnuts vs. Cold Stone Creamery's ice cream. Hence, it should be unusual for any common consumer along the line to intentionally buy both products at the same time.
For this case, we could regard the common consumer as a "product 1 consumer" and also a "product 2 consumer,"who are independent of each other; and then, our existing model could be still used to analyze the space-exchange problem.
Despite the above argument, in reality, there may still exist some common consumer(s) who intend to buy both products concurrently. However, if we relax our assumption on the dependence of the product 1 consumers and the product 2 consumers, then our model may become intractably complicated and we could not draw any meaningful analytical insights.
Therefore, we do not incorporate such common consumers into our model but subsequently discuss how our major results would possibly change when a common consumer (who intends to buy both products concurrently) exists.
We learn from our analysis in Sections 3 and 4 that, in the Nash equilibrium, retailer i As Figure 3(a) indicates, the product 1 and the product 2 consumers in zone 1 visit retailer 1's store to buy products 1 and 2, respectively, when there is no common consumer. If we assume that there is a common consumer at a point in zone 1, then the consumer will still buy both products in retailer 1's store. That is, for Case (a), the presence of common consumers in zone 1 would not increase the demands for two products in each store; thus, it may not result in any change in two retailers'pricing and space-allocation decisions. Similarly, any common consumer in zone 3 will decide to buy two products in retailer 2's store. This does not increase or decrease the demands faced by two retailers in each store, and would not change two retailers'decisions.
If a common consumer is located in zone 2, then the total demand for each product in two stores should be unchanged but the demands faced by two retailers in each store may di¤er from those with no common consumer. Speci…cally, if there is no common consumer in zone 2, then the product 1 and the product 2 consumers will buy in di¤erent stores. But, if a common consumer in zone 2 is closer tox 2 , then he or she may be likely to buy both products in retailer 1's store. As a result, compared with the "no common consumer"case, the demand for product 2 in retailer 1's store is increased by 1 unit and that in retailer 2's store is decreased by 1 unit, whereas the demand for product 1 in each store is not changed. Even though retailer 2 needs to sells one more unit in retailer 1's store, retailer 1 is unlikely to allocate one more space to retailer 2 because retailer 1 should keep his host space to serve existing customers. If two retailers have already used the total space S 1 , then retailer 2 may respond by increasing his price p 21 for product 2 in retailer 1's store but decreasing his price p 22 for product 2 in his own store, in order to "move" a consumer from retailer 1's store to retailer 2's store. On the other hand, if there is an excess space in retailer 1's store, then retailer 2 should take over one more unit of the space to satisfy the demand by the common consumer; as a result, two retailers do not change their pricing decisions.
Next, we discuss the impacts of the presence of a common consumer in Case (b), which corresponds to Figure 3(b) where the product i (i = 1; 2) consumers residing at the left of x i1 and those at the right ofx i2 buy in retailer 1's and retailer 2's stores, respectively. Using our arguments for Case (a), a common consumer in zones 1 and 3 would have no impact on two retailers'decisions; and, the presence of a common consumer in zone 2 would lead to an increase in the demand faced by one or two retailers at a store. The retailers may change their prices at two stores if there is no excess space at the store where the demand rises, or may keep the prices unchanged and use the excess space otherwise. Similarly, we …nd that, for Case (c), there would be no change if a common consumer is in zones 1 and 3, but the existence of a common consumer in zone 2 would result in the price changes at two stores when there is no excess space. Summarizing our above discussion, we draw the implications as given in the following remark.
Remark 3 If a consumer intends to buy both products 1 and 2, then the demand faced by one or two retailers at a store may be increased and two retailers may respond by changing their pricing and space-allocation decisions. Speci…cally, the presence of a common consumer close to a store is unlikely to change two retailers'decisions. However, if a common consumer resides in a middle point between two stores, then one or two retailers may face an increasing demand at a store, thereby increasing their prices if there is no excess space at the store or keeping the prices unchanged but using the excess space. As a result, if a common consumer exists, then two retailers'pro…ts could be increased. Moreover, our above discussion also implies that Propositions 1, 2, and 3 should hold in the presence of common consumers. C
Presence of Fixed Costs
In actual practice, two retailers (e.g., Waitrose and Boots, Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery) may be willing to exchange shelf space instead of opening their own new stores. A motivation for two retailers to exchange shelf space would be mainly attributed to the fact that each retailer incurs a …xed cost in opening and sta¢ ng a new store, but does not pay for such a cost in exchanging his shelf space with the other retailer. We now examine whether or not our major results would change if we consider …xed costs in our Hotelling model. Suppose that retailer i (i = 1; 2) will decide to (i) open a new store at retailer j's site (j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i), or (ii) exchange shelf space with retailer j. Each retailer should choose one from the two options (i) and (ii).
Noting that two retailers'…xed costs are independent of their pricing and space-allocation decisions, we …nd that, if each retailer's store is su¢ ciently large, then incorporating such costs into our model should not change two retailers' decisions, and exchanging shelf space should result in a higher pro…t for each retailer compared with opening a new store. Otherwise, if a retailer's store is small, then the retailer cannot allot a su¢ ciently large space to the other retailer, who may then respond by opening a new store instead of exchanging shelf space. Such a result is in agreement with Proposition 3, which indicates that two retailers should decide to implement the space-exchange strategy in Nash equilibrium, if and only if each retailer's total shelf space is large enough to serve more than a half of his consumers. In Section 4 we perform our game analysis, assuming that each retailer has a su¢ ciently large store. Such an assumption is compatible with the practice that the retailers exchanging shelf space include, e.g., Waitrose, Boots, Tim Hortons, and Cold Stone Creamery. It thus follows that our results in this paper do not change if we consider each retailer's …xed cost of opening and sta¢ ng a new store.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by the practice of Waitrose and Boots (and also, Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery) where these retailers exchange shelf space to increase their pro…ts. We use the Hotelling model to analyze a two-retailer problem. Before the space exchange, each consumer can buy only in one store; but, after two retailers implement the space-exchange strategy, the consumer can access each retailer's product in two stores and thus visit a store closer to the consumer's location to buy.
We …rst assume that two retailers do not exchange shelf space, and maximize each retailer's pro…t to …nd the optimal price for the retailer's product in his own store. Then, we determine each retailer's optimal prices in two stores given his host space and guest space under the spaceexchange strategy, and …nd that the space-dependent prices are impacted by whether or not all of the retailer's consumers can enjoy a positive net utility from buying in any store.
Using the optimal space-dependent price, we consider a non-cooperative game where each retailer makes the space allocation decision for his own store to maximize the total pro…t in two stores. We show that two retailers should decide to implement the space-exchange strategy in the game, if and only if the total space in each retailer's store is large enough to serve more than a half of the retailer's consumers. Nash equilibrium for the game may or may not uniquely exist, depending on consumers'utilities and trip costs as well as the total space in each store.
We also …nd that, in the Nash equilibrium, each retailer's prices in two stores may or may not be identical but they are both higher than the retailer's price before the space exchange, and two retailers'pro…ts are higher than those before they implement the space-exchange strategy.
We also discuss possible changes of our major results when there exists a common consumer who buys both products 1 and 2, and those when a retailer's …xed cost for opening and sta¢ ng a new store is considered.
As we discuss in Section 1, the informational advantage and the risk reduction should be the two main advantages of the space-exchange strategy. In this paper, we focus on consumers' increased choices and reduced trip costs, which should be the major advantage for the strategy.
The analysis of the informational advantage and the risk reduction for the space-exchange problem would be a future research direction. 
Appendix A Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. We …rst consider retailer 1's optimal pricing decision. We learn from (2) that retailer 1's pro…t depends on the comparison between x 1 = ( u 1 p 1 )=t and S 1 =B 1 . We perform our analysis for the following two cases:
1. When S 1 B 1 , retailer 1's pro…t function in (2) can be re-written as 1 = B 1 (p 1 c 1 ) x 1 = B 1 (p 1 c 1 ) ( u 1 p 1 ) =t. The …rst-and second-order derivatives of 1 w.r.t. p 1 are thus computed as,
Temporarily ignoring the constraint that u 1 t p 1 u 1 , we …nd that the optimal price maximizing 1 is ( u 1 + c 1 )=2, which is smaller than or equal to u 1 because u 1 c 1 . Considering the constraint that u 1 t p 1 u 1 , we …nd the optimal price for this case as
Next, we calculate retailer 1's maximum pro…t. From the above, we …nd that we should compare ( u 1 + c 1 )=2 and u 1 t to determine retailer 1's optimal price and compute the corresponding maximum pro…t. (a) If ( u 1 +c 1 )=2 u 1 t, or, c 1 +2t u 1 , then retailer 1's optimal price is p 1 = ( u 1 +c 1 )=2
and his maximum pro…t is calculated as,
, then retailer 1's optimal price is p 1 = u 1 t and his maximum pro…t is found as 1 = B 1 ( u 1 t c 1 ). 2. When S 1 < B 1 , we need to compare x 1 and S 1 =B 1 to determine the optimal retail price for this case. Speci…cally, (a) When x 1 S 1 =B 1 , or, p 1 u 1 tS 1 =B 1 , retailer 1's pro…t function can be rewritten as 1 = B 1 (p 1 c 1 ) ( u 1 p 1 ) =t. Noting that S 1 =B 1 < 1, we …nd that u 1 tS 1 =B 1 > u 1 t and the maximization constraint for this case thus becomes u 1 tS 1 =B 1 p 1 u 1 . Using our argument for the …rst case, we …nd the optimal price for this case as max[(
, which is increasing in p 1 . Therefore, for this case, the optimal retail price is u 1 tS 1 =B 1 . According to the above, we …nd that, when S 1 < B 1 , retailer 1's optimal price is determined as
, and his maximum pro…t is calculated as,
(b) If c 1 + 2tS 1 =B 1 u 1 , then retailer 1's optimal price is p 1 = u 1 tS 1 =B 1 and his maximum pro…t is 1 = ( u 1 tS 1 =B 1 c 1 ) S 1 . We can similarly compute retailer 2's optimal price and maximum pro…t. The lemma is thus proved.
Proof of Lemma 2. We …rst perform our analysis for retailer 1. As Remark 1 indicates, there are two cases in which retailer 1 can set his prices in two stores to a¤ect consumers'demands. We compute the retailer's optimal prices for the two cases as follows:
1. Retailer 1 determines his retail prices (p 11 ; p 12 ) under the constraint that p 21 +p 11 2 u 1 t.
As discussed in Remark 1, for this case, all consumers must have a non-negative utility and thus decide to buy from retailer 1. Because the demands faced by retailer 1 in two stores are D 11 = B 1 (p 12 p 11 + t)=(2t) and D 12 = B 1 (p 11 p 12 + t)=(2t), we can construct retailer 1's pro…t for this case as,
Retailer 1's maximization problem is thus developed as, max 1 , s.t. p 12 + p 11 2 u 1 t and t p 12 p 11 t. Note that the second constraint is involved because, as discussed previously, all of B 1 consumers are uniformly distributed between the sites of retailers 1 and 2.
The …rst-, second-order, and cross-partial derivatives of 1 w.r.t. p 11 and p 12 are calculated as,
It is easy to show the Hessian's negative de…niteness. Thus, the pro…t 1 in (4) It is easy to prove that the Hessian's de…niteness is negative, and retailer 1's pro…t 1 in (5) is jointly concave in p 11 and p 12 . However, we cannot immediately compute the optimal prices by solving the …rst-order conditions (i.e., @ 1 =@p 11 = 0 and @ 1 =@p 12 = 0), because, otherwise, the demand in terms of optimal prices may be greater than the total demand B 1 , which is speci…ed as follows: Temporarily ignoring the above concern regarding the demand, we solve the equations that @ 1 =@p 11 = 0 and @ 1 =@p 12 = 0 to make retailer 1's optimal pricing decisions as p 11 = p 12 = ( u 1 + c 1 )=2. The resulting demands in two stores are thus computed as 
, which implies that the optimal prices are too low and retailer 1 can raise his prices to increase his pro…t margin without losing any consumer. Since retailer 1 will satisfy all B 1 consumers, similar to Case 1, we can …nd his decisions as p 11 = p 12 = u 1 t=2, which is higher than the price ( u 1 + c 1 )=2 (that is optimal when u 1 c 1 + t). The demands in two stores are then computed as D 11 = D 12 = B 1 =2, and the total demand is D 11 + D 12 = B 1 . Retailer 1's pro…ts in two stores are both computed as B 1 ( u 1 c 1 t=2), and his total pro…t is thus 1 = B 1 ( u 1 c 1 t=2). Note that, if the retail prices p 11 and p 12 are both reduced to retailer 1's acquisition cost c 1 and the product 1 consumer residing at the location 1 (i.e., retailer 2's store) intends to buy in retailer 1's store, then the consumer enjoys the utility u 1 but incurs the cost c 1 + t. The above condition that u 1 c 1 + t means that the product 1 consumer at the site of retailer 2's store has a non-positive net utility if he or she goes to retailer 1's store to buy a unit of product 1. We can similarly perform our analysis for retailer 2. This proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.
We …rst analyze retailer 1's optimal pricing decisions. We consider two cases-i.e., S 11 + S 21 B 1 and S 11 + S 21 < B 1 -to determine retailer 1's optimal pricing decisions. We …rst investigate the case that S 11 + S 21 B 1 , which means that retailer 1's total space S 11 + S 21 in two stores is large enough to stock B 1 units of products. When S 11 + S 21 B 1 , we need to consider the following three scenarios: (i) S 11 B 1 =2 and S 21 B 1 =2; (ii) S 11 < B 1 =2 and S 21 > B 1 =2; and (iii) S 11 > B 1 =2 and S 21 < B 1 =2. For the scenario (i), we learn from Lemma 2 that the optimal prices are determined as p 11 = p 12 = u 1 t=2, and the resulting demands in two stores are both equal to B 1 =2.
Next we consider the scenario (ii), where, in retailer 1's own store, retailer 1 cannot satisfy a half of the total demand. This means that, even though the retailer can carry su¢ cient number of product 1 in two stores, the retailer's optimal pricing decisions under the capacity constraint may not result in the ful…llment of the total demand B 1 . Recall from Remark 1 that retailer 1 may determine his prices such that p 11 + p 12 2 u 1 t or may make his pricing decisions such that p 11 + p 12 2 u 1 t. Next, we maximize retailer 1's pro…t when p 11 + p 12 2 u 1 t and maximize that when p 11 + p 12 2 u 1 t, and then compare the maximum pro…ts to …nd the optimal prices for the retailer.
1 According to Lemma 2, the optimal price p 11 maximizing B 1 (p 11 c 1 )( u 1 p 11 )=t should be equal to ( u 1 + c 1 )=2, and the resulting demand for product 1 in retailer 1's store is B 1 ( u 1 c 1 )=(2t), which is greater than B 1 =2 because u 1 > c 1 + t. Since S 11 < B 1 =2, the retailer should increase the price p 11 from ( u 1 + c 1 )=2 to a value such that the total demand in retailer 1's store-i.e., B 1 ( u 1 p 11 )=t-is equal to the available number S 11 . Solving the equation that B 1 ( u 1 p 11 )=t = S 11 gives the price p 11 = u 1 tS 11 =B 1 , which is greater than ( u 1 + c 1 )=2 since u 1 > c 1 + t. Because of the constraint that p 11 + p 12 + t 2 u 1 , the price p 12 should be greater than or equal to u 1 t(1 S 11 =B 1 ), which occurs if and only if the total demand for product 1 in retailer 2's store-that is, B 1 ( u 1 p 12 )=t-is smaller than or equal to the available quantity B 1 S 11 . Therefore, retailer 1's pro…t generated in retailer 2's store is calculated as B 1 (p 12 c 1 )( u 1 p 12 ) Similar to the above analysis for retailer 1, we can …nd retailer 2's optimal prices. This proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4. We …rst consider the price comparison for retailer 1, which will similarly apply to retailer 2. We …nd from Lemma 1 that, when the two retailers do not exchange shelf space, retailer 1's optimal price p 1 depends on S 1 ; and we note from Lemma 3 that retailer 1's optimal price p 11 and p 12 under the space-exchange strategy depend on the values of S 11 and S 21 . Thus, for this proof, we have to compare any pair of optimal prices in two settings. 
1 is increasing in S 11 and the retailer should thus determine his optimal host space as S 11 = S 1 . However, we …nd from Theorems 3 and 5 and Table 3 that the retailer's optimal price in retailer 2's store is p 12 = ( u 1 + c 1 )=2 and the resulting sales in his guest space is B 1 ( u 1 c 1 )=(2t), which is smaller than B 1 S 1 . Thus, when S 1 < B 1 [1 ( u 1 c 1 )=(2t)], the retailer only needs the guest space B 1 ( u 1 c 1 )=(2t) and does not serve all consumers. If S 1 + S 21 B 1 but S 21 < B 1 , then Table 3 indicates that retailer 1's maximum pro…t depends on his guest space in retailer 2's store. Similar to our above discussion when S 1 < B 1 =2, we …nd that, if B 1 [1 ( u 1 c 1 )=(2t)] S 21 < B 1 =2, then retailer 1 should accept the space S 21 given by retailer 2, and he should determine his optimal host space as S 11 = B 1 S 21 and allocate the space S 12 = S 1 B 1 + S 21 to retailer 2. As a result, the retailer serves all of B 1 product 1 consumers. If S 21 < B 1 [1 ( u 1 c 1 )=(2t)], then retailer 1 still accepts the guest space S 21 , but determines his optimal host space as S 11 = B 1 ( u 1 c 1 )=(2t) and allocates to retailer 2 the space S 12 = S 1 B 1 ( u 1 c 1 )=(2t). Proof of Lemma 7. The proof is the same as that for the case of S i + S ji < B i (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j) in Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 8.
], for i = 1; 2, we …nd from Lemma 7 that retailer i's best-response space decision is B i ( u i c 1 )=(2t). When two retailers retain their host shelf space in Nash equilibrium, we can …nd that, to implement the space-exchange strategy, retailer i allocates the space S , under which two retailers should decide to exchange shelf space. Then, using Lemma 5, we can compute two retailers'corresponding optimal prices as given in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 9. To facilitate our proof, we consider the case that u 1 > c 1 + t and u 2 c 2 + t, and …nd the corresponding Nash equilibrium. According to Lemma 7, we …nd that, if u 2 c 2 + t, then retailer 2's optimal space decision S 22 is the same as that when S 2 + S 12 < B 2 in Table 4 . That is, for this case, retailer 2's optimal space decisions is always S 22 = B 2 ( u 2 c 2 )=(2tr 2 ); see Figure 4 (a). Using our best-response analysis, we draw Figure  4 (b) to show retailer 1's best space decision S 11 given retailer 2's decision S 22 .
Since the line S 22 = B 2 ( u 2 c 2 )=(2tr 2 ) in Figure 4 (a) may intersect with each of three line segments in Figure 4(b) , there are three possible unique Nash equilibria, as given in Table 5 . Replacing 1 and 2 with i and j (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j), we prove this lemma. Proof of Lemma 10. We draw Figure 5 to show two retailers'best responses. To …nd Nash equilibrium, we need to discuss where two retailers'best-response functions intersect, because the intersection point represents a Nash equilibrium. As Figure 5 indicates, each retailer's best response is a step function consisting of three segments. Therefore, we have to consider 13 scenarios, as shown in Figure 6 . For each scenario, we can calculate the corresponding Nash equilibrium, which is represented by the intersection of two retailers' best-response functions in Figure 6 . For our solution, see Table 7 in online Appendix F. This proves the lemma. retailer 1. This means that, for this case, some consumer(s) may not decide to purchase product i. Figure 7 (b) indicates that only consumers between the points 0 andx i1 should buy in retailer 1's store, and only consumers betweenx i2 and 1 should buy in retailer 2's store. The demands faced by retailer i in the two stores are thus computed as,
The total demand faced by retailer i is thus B i (2 u i p i1 p i2 )=t; this means that, if retailer i's prices (p i1 ; p i2 ) are determined such that p i1 + p i2 2 u i t, then he shall only serve (2 u i p i1 p i2 )=t (rather than all) of B i consumers in the market. From the above we …nd that all product i consumers buy whenx i1
x i whereas some consumer(s) may not buy whenx i2 x i . Note that, if p i1 + p i2 = 2 u i t, thenx i1 =x i2 =x i , and the demands for the above two cases are the same, which means that all consumers will buy but no consumer can enjoy a non-negative utility from buying from both stores.
j allocates a unit of shelf space to retailer i, retailer i's best response in the non-cooperative setting is not to also allocate a unit of shelf space to retailer j but to keep all of his shelf space S i , because, as discussed in Section 4.1, retailer i's pro…t is increasing in the space S i when S i is so small that retailer i cannot serve a half of B i consumers [i.e., S i B i ( u i c i )=(2t)]. Hence, two retailers'space allocation decisions (S ii = S jj = 1, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j) cannot be obtained in equilibrium. That is, two retailers'decisions in Nash equilibrium may not be the Pareto optimal. Such a result can be actually regarded as "Prisoner's Dilemma," which is indicated as in Table 6 where we note that there is a unique Nash equilibrium (S 11 ; S 22 ) = (2; 2) because 1 (2; 1) > 1 (1; 1) > 1 (2; 0) > 1 (1; 0) and 2 (1; 2) > 2 (1; 1) > 2 (0; 2) > 2 (0; 1). For more information regarding Prisoner's Dilemma, see, e.g., Stra¢ n [13, Ch. 12]. ( 1 (2; 0); 2 (0; 2)) [(S 11 ; S 22 ) = (2; 2)] Table 6 : The "Prisoner's dilemma"in the space-exchange game. Retailer i (i = 1; 2)'s decision "Allocate" means that the retailer decides to allocate a unit of his shelf space to retailer j (j = 1; 2, j 6 = i), and Retailer i's decision "Do Not Allocate" means that the retailer does not allocate any space to retailer j but keeps all of his space S i . In addition, i (S ii ; S ji ) and j (S ij ; S jj ) denote retailers i's and j's pro…ts when the retailers' space decisions are S ii and S jj , respectively. Note that 1 (2; 1) > 1 (1; 1) > 1 (2; 0) > 1 (1; 0) and 2 (1; 2) > 2 (1; 1) > 2 (0; 2) > 2 (0; 1).
Moreover, if a retailer's store is very small, then two retailers may be willing to open new stores instead of exchange shelf space (if their costs of opening and sta¢ ng new stores are not large). For a speci…c discussion on the impact of …xed costs, see Section 5.2. Our result in Proposition 3 is also in gear with the practice that the retailers exchanging shelf space include, e.g., Waitrose, Boots, Tim Hortons, and Cold Stone Creamery.
Appendix F Nash Equilibrium when u i > c 1 + t (i = 1; 2)
For our game analysis for the case that u i > c i + t (i = 1; 2) in Section 4.2, we provide thirteen possible Nash equilibria in Table 7 . Table 7 : Nash equilibria for 13 scenarios when u 1 > c 1 + t and u 2 > c 2 + t.
